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This past Term, in Betterman v. Montana,1 the U.S. Supreme Court took up 
the question whether the Sixth Amendment’s speedy trial guarantee applies to 
sentencing proceedings.  In a unanimous opinion by Justice Ginsburg, the Court 
held that it does not. 
Perhaps in order to achieve unanimity, Betterman left open important 
questions, which may ultimately allow defendants, at least in some situations, to 
demand a speedy sentencing.  But, on the whole, Betterman represents an 
unfortunate example of the courts’ tendency to underenforce constitutional rights 
at sentencing.  
 
I.  THE CASE 
 
Brandon Betterman pled guilty to bail jumping after he failed to appear in 
court on domestic assault charges.2  After pleading guilty, Betterman spent more 
than fourteen months in jail before he was sentenced.3  After the sentence was 
imposed, Betterman appealed, arguing that the post-conviction, pre-sentencing 
delay violated the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment.  The Montana 
Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence, concluding that the Speedy 
Trial Clause does not apply to sentencing proceedings.4  Because federal and state 
courts were split on the question whether the Speedy Trial Clause applies to 
sentencing, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Montana Supreme Court.  It 
held that the Speedy Trial Clause ceases to operate at the moment of conviction, 
and therefore does not apply to sentencing.5  In reaching this conclusion, the Court 
relied mainly on the text of the Sixth Amendment and its inference that the Clause 
was meant to protect the presumption of innocence.  According to the Court, the 
Clause does not apply to sentencing proceedings because the text of the Clause 
                                                                                                                            
 
   Anne Shea Ransdell and William Garland “Buck” Ransdell, Jr. Distinguished Professor of 
Law at the University of North Carolina School of Law. 
1   Betterman v. Montana, 136 S. Ct. 1609 (2016). 
2   Id. at 1612. 
3   Id. 
4   Id. at 1613. 
5   Id. 
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limits its scope to pre-conviction proceedings.  In particular, the Court focused on 
the language from the Sixth Amendment that “guarantees ‘the accused’ ‘the right 
to a speedy . . . trial.’” 6   As for the purpose of the Clause—to protect the 
presumption of innocence—the Court said, “[a]s a measure protecting the 
presumptively innocent, the speedy trial right—like other similarly aimed 
measures—loses force upon conviction.”7  Extending the Clause to sentencing 
proceedings is unnecessary, according to the Court, because “factual disputes, if 
any there be, at sentencing, do not go to the question of guilt; they are geared, 
instead, to ascertaining the proper sentence within boundaries set by statutory 
minimums and maximums.”8  Notably, the Court asserted that its decision did not 
render “inapplicable to sentencing” other provisions of the Sixth Amendment, such 
as the right to counsel, which “protect[s] interests other than the presumption of 
innocence.”9 
In deciding that the speedy trial right does not apply to sentencing 
proceedings, the Court left open two important questions.  First, it explicitly 
“reserve[d] the question” whether the speedy trial right applies to “bifurcated 
proceedings in which, at the sentencing stage, facts that could increase the 
proscribed sentencing range are determined (e.g., capital cases in which eligibility 
for the death penalty hinges on aggravating factor findings).”10  Two concurring 
Justices—Justices Thomas and Alito—emphasized that this question remained 
open, stating: “[T]he Sixth Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause does not apply to 
sentencing proceedings, except perhaps to bifurcated sentencing proceedings 
where sentencing enhancements operate as functional elements of a greater 
offense.”11 
Second, the Court explicitly left open the possibility that defendants could 
raise due process challenges if their sentencings were unduly delayed and if that 
delay led to a sentencing proceeding that was not “fundamentally fair.”12 
 
II.  THE UNDERENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS AT SENTENCING 
 
Constitutional rights are underenforced at sentencing.13  Although the recent 
trend has been in favor of recognizing more rights at sentencing,14 defendants 
                                                                                                                            
 
6   Id. at 1614 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XI and noting that emphasis has been added). 
7   Id. 
8   Id. at 1616. 
9   Id. at 1615 n.4. 
10  Id. at 1613 n.2. 
11  Id. at 1618 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
12  “After conviction, a defendant’s due process right to liberty, while diminished, is still 
present.  He retains an interest in a sentencing proceeding that is fundamentally fair.  But because 
Betterman advanced no due process claim here, we express no opinion on how he might fare under 
that more pliable standard.”  Id. at 1617–18 (citation omitted). 
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enjoy fewer constitutional rights at sentencing than they do at the guilt phase of 
trial.15  This is true for both procedural rights and substantive rights.  That is to say, 
not only are there fewer procedural rights that a defendant can demand at 
sentencing—such as the right to confront witnesses—but judges can also increase 
sentences for reasons that appear to infringe on substantive constitutional rights.  
So, for example, a judge can increase a defendant’s sentence for failure to express 
remorse, even though it would be considered a violation of First Amendment rights 
to make lack of remorse a crime.16 
Betterman continues in this vein.  In deciding that the speedy trial right does 
not apply to sentencing proceedings, the Court has added another procedural right 
to the list of rights that apply at trial but not at sentencing.  Betterman thus 
represents another example of underenforcement of a constitutional right at 
sentencing. 
The underenforcement of procedural rights at sentencing may be attributable 
to the fact that the stakes seem much lower at sentencing than at trial.17  After all, 
trials exist to determine guilt or innocence.  If a defendant is not guilty, then the 
state may not punish her.  In contrast, guilt is a forgone conclusion at sentencing; 
the only question is how much punishment to impose.  The greater procedural 
protections at trial are necessary in order to ensure that innocent defendants are not 
convicted.  We ensure that innocent defendants are not convicted, in part, by 
resolving issues of uncertainty in defendants’ favor.  That is why, for example, 
prosecutors must prove elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 18  
Erroneous decisions at sentencing are assumed to be less consequential—they go 
only to amount of punishment, not innocence—and thus procedural protections do 
not seem as necessary.19  For this reason, prosecutors need only prove sentencing 
facts by a preponderance of the evidence rather than beyond a reasonable doubt.20 
                                                                                                                            
13  In saying that constitutional rights are “underenforced” at sentencing, I mean that the Court 
has “stop[ped] short of fully enforcing the Constitution” at sentencing, but that these limitations “do 
not mark the substantive boundaries of the Constitution.”  Lawrence Sager, Material Rights, 
Underenforcement, and the Adjudication Thesis, 90 B.U. L. REV. 579, 580 (2010). 
14  Alan C. Michaels, Trial Rights at Sentencing, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1771, 1773–74 (2003); 
Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Procedural Rights at Sentencing, 90 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 187, 232–33 (2014) [hereinafter Hessick & Hessick, Procedural Rights]. 
15  See Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Recognizing Constitutional Rights at 
Sentencing, 99 CAL. L. REV. 47, 53–56 (2011) [hereinafter Hessick & Hessick, Constitutional Rights] 
(collecting procedural and substantive constitutional limits on sentencing). 
16  Id. at 66–70. 
17  While this may explain the underenforcement of procedural rights at sentencing, it does not 
explain the underenforcement of substantive rights at sentencing.  For more on that topic, see Hessick 
& Hessick, Constitutional Rights, supra note 15. 
18  “The reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal 
procedure.  It is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error.”  In 
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970). 
19  Alan Michaels has made this observation: 
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The Betterman decision appears to follow this pattern.  The Court justified its 
refusal to extend the speedy trial right at sentencing on the theory that the right 
protects the presumption of innocence, and that defendants who have been 
convicted and await sentencing are, by definition, not innocent. 
But the assumption underlying the underenforcement of procedural rights at 
sentencing—that procedural protections are less necessary because sentencing 
errors are less consequential—suffers from at least three defects.  First, the mere 
fact that a procedural protection is less important at sentencing does not mean that 
the protection is unnecessary.  Even if a right seems less important in one situation 
than in another, the right still might be important enough in the latter situation to 
warrant protection.  The right to counsel, for example, seems less important when a 
defendant is facing only a six month sentence than when she is facing life in 
prison, but the Court has said that the appointment of counsel attaches in any case 
involving actual imprisonment.21 
Second, the assumption that sentencing errors are less consequential than 
innocence errors may not be true in all cases.  Instead, the relative consequences of 
those errors depend in large part on the circumstances.  When we think about 
errors in sentencing, we likely imagine a defendant who is sentenced to six years in 
prison, rather than five.  But that assumed scenario hardly captures the range of 
sentencing situations and how the consequences of those situations compare to 
questions of innocence.  Some defendants may be more concerned about receiving 
an excessively harsh sentence than receiving an erroneous determination of guilt. 
Consider, for example, the common practice of defendants who plead guilty 
to low-level charges in order to avoid prolonged pre-trial detention.  The prevailing 
conventional wisdom is that innocent defendants will plead guilty in order to 
receive a sentence of time served if they are denied bail and would otherwise be 
incarcerated while awaiting trial. 22   For those defendants, an erroneous 
                                                                                                                            
There is . . . no constitutionally mandated presumption of “sentencing innocence”; within 
the range of legislatively prescribed sentences for the crime, “too high” is neither better 
nor worse than “too low.”  In this vision, the defendant, by virtue of his conviction, has 
lost the constitutional entitlement to have errors resolved in his favor that protected him 
at trial. 
Michaels, supra note 14, at 1778. 
20  See United States v. O’Brien, 560 U.S. 218, 224 (2010). 
21  See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
22  See, e.g., Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1162 (2008) 
(arguing that most innocent misdemeanants are better off pleading guilty in light of the costs and 
risks of litigation); Samuel Gross & Barbara O’Brian, Frequency and Predictors of False Conviction: 
Why We Know So Little, and New Data on Capital Cases, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 927, 930–31 
(2008) (“[I]t is entirely possible that most wrongful convictions—like 90 percent or more of all 
criminal convictions—are based on negotiated guilty pleas to comparatively light charges, and that 
the innocent defendants in those cases received little or no time in custody.  If so, it may well be that 
a major cause of these comparatively low-level miscarriages of justice is the prospect of prolonged 
pretrial detention by innocent defendants who are unable to post bail.” (footnote omitted)); Kevin C. 
McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 987 (1989) 
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determination of guilt is preferable to more time in jail.  Indeed, the very premise 
underlying our current system of plea bargaining is that a defendant—even an 
innocent defendant—would prefer to trade the possibility of an acquittal for a 
reduction in her criminal sentence.23   
Even outside of the plea bargaining context, the consequences associated with 
sentencing can be more devastating than the consequences associated with 
conviction.  The devastating consequences of capital sentencing decisions have led 
the Supreme Court to require trial-like procedures for sentencing decisions 
involving the death penalty.24  The severity of the death penalty has led the Court 
to conclude that those sentencing decisions must be particularly reliable.  The 
Court has grounded those decisions in the Eighth Amendment, stating that the 
death penalty is unusual in its severity and its finality.25  “Death . . . differs more 
from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year 
or two.  Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference 
in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate 
punishment in a specific case.”26 
It is, of course, a truism to state that death is different.  It is, however, less 
obviously true that the qualitative difference between death and other punishments 
requires procedural protections unique to the death penalty context—that is, 
protections that are denied to other criminal defendants.27  Indeed, the decisions 
applying the Eighth Amendment capital sentencing framework to life-without-
parole sentences in recent years suggest that the Court may be increasingly 
receptive to arguments that constitutional protections which were once limited to 
capital sentencing may be necessary in noncapital proceedings.28  And if the Court 
                                                                                                                            
(explaining the “substantial incentive for a rational, innocent defendant to plead guilty” in this 
situation). 
23  See, e.g., Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining As Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 
1909, 1943 (1992) (explaining why some plea bargains “will often prove attractive even to the 
innocent”). 
24  See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686–87 (1984) (observing that a capital 
sentencing proceeding is “like a trial in its adversarial format and in the existence of standards for 
decision” and thus concluding that in assessing the constitutional obligations of counsel to provide 
effective representation, a “capital sentencing proceeding need not be distinguished from an ordinary 
trial”). 
25  See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998–99 (1983) (“The Court, as well as the separate 
opinions of a majority of the individual Justices, has recognized that the qualitative difference of 
death from all other punishments requires a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital 
sentencing determination.”); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (“There is no question that 
death as a punishment is unique in its severity and irrevocability.”). 
26  Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and 
Stevens, JJ.). 
27  See generally Note, The Rhetoric of Difference and the Legitimacy of Capital Punishment, 
114 HARV. L. REV. 1599 (2001). 
28  See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (holding that the Eighth Amendment forbids 
the mandatory imposition of life without parole sentences on juveniles); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 
 OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW [Vol 14:323 
 
 
328 
continues to expand its Eight Amendment holdings outside of the capital 
sentencing context, then the need for procedural protections at non-capital 
sentencing may seem more acute.  After all, the text of the Eighth Amendment 
speaks only in terms of “cruel and unusual punishment”; it does not distinguish 
between death and other sentences.29 
Third, presumably because of the consequences associated with sentencing, 
the Supreme Court has extended a number of the procedural rights ordinarily 
associated with trial to defendants in non-capital sentencing proceedings over the 
past several decades. 30   Take, for example, the right to counsel.  When the 
Supreme Court first recognized the right to counsel, it did so largely because of 
concerns about the presumption of innocence.  In both Powell v. Alabama and 
Gideon v. Wainwright—the two seminal cases establishing the right to the 
appointment of counsel for criminal defendants—the Court emphasized that, 
without the right to counsel “though he be not guilty, [a defendant] faces the 
danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.”31  
The Supreme Court eventually extended the right to counsel to sentencing 
proceedings.  It did so even though the defendant has already been convicted, and 
thus the presumption of innocence is no longer in effect.  When extending the right 
to counsel to sentencing proceedings, the Court no longer spoke in terms of the 
danger of convicting an innocent defendant, but instead in terms of how an 
attorney would help a defendant at a sentencing proceeding.  For example, in 
Mempa v. Rhay, the Court stated that “the necessity for the aid of counsel in 
                                                                                                                            
48 (2010) (holding that life-without-parole sentences for juvenile defendants who committed non-
homicide crimes are barred by the Eighth Amendment). 
29  “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted.”  U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
30  See Michaels, supra note 14, at 1785 (identifying those trial rights which have been 
extended to sentencing proceedings and those that have not). 
31  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 
(1932).  Indeed, the concerns that the Court raised in Powell and then reiterated in Gideon seem to 
speak to the presumption of innocence: 
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the 
right to be heard by counsel.  Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and 
sometimes no skill in the science of law.  If charged with crime, he is incapable, 
generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad.  He is 
unfamiliar with the rules of evidence.  Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on 
trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence 
irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible.  He lacks both the skill and knowledge 
adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one.  He requires the 
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.  Without it, though 
he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to 
establish his innocence.  If that be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it 
of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect.  If in any case, civil of criminal, 
a state or federal court were arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party by counsel, employed by 
and appearing for him, it reasonably may not be doubted that such a refusal would be a 
denial of a hearing, and, therefore, of due process in the constitutional sense. 
Id. at 68–69.   
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marshaling the facts, introducing evidence of mitigating circumstances and in 
general aiding and assisting the defendant to present his case as to sentence is 
apparent.”32 
 
III. UNDERENFORCEMENT IN BETTERMAN 
 
The Betterman Court purported to distinguish the right to counsel from the 
speedy trial right on the ground that the right to counsel “protect[s] interests other 
than the presumption of innocence.”33  But the speedy trial right also protects 
interests other than the presumption of innocence.  And in failing to extend the 
speedy trial right to sentencing, the Court underenforced that right. 
Earlier cases make clear that the Speedy Trial Clause is “essential to protect at 
least three basic demands of criminal justice in the Anglo-American legal system: 
‘(1) to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, (2) to minimize 
anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation and (3) to limit the 
possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend 
himself.’”34  Although incarceration prior to trial is not a concern for sentencing 
proceedings, some of the other reasons for the speedy trial right exist at sentencing.  
A defendant who does not know what her sentence will be is likely to experience 
“anxiety and concern” that is similar to (though obviously not identical to) the 
anxiety and concern that a defendant experiences before trial.  A defendant will be 
anxious and concerned before trial about whether she will be acquitted or 
convicted.  While awaiting sentencing, a defendant will be anxious about how 
much punishment she will receive.  And for some defendants, the uncertainty 
about sentence will not look appreciably different than a defendant who is awaiting 
trial.  Defendants may be able to convince a judge to impose probation, rather than 
a prison term, for example.  Not knowing whether you will be incarcerated is not 
dissimilar to not knowing whether you will be convicted. 
Delay between conviction and sentencing will also affect a defendant’s ability 
to present a convincing mitigation case at sentencing.  As discussed in more detail 
below,35 the amount of punishment a defendant receives at sentencing often turns 
on factual determinations by a judge about a defendant’s crime or her character.  
The more time that passes between conviction and sentencing, the more difficult it 
may be for a defendant to present evidence on those issues to the judge. 
One of the principle reasons the Betterman Court offered in support of its 
decision was textual. 36   Extending the speedy trial right to sentencing seems 
                                                                                                                            
 
32  Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 135 (1967). 
33  Betterman v. Montana, 136 S. Ct. 1609, 1615 n.4 (2016). 
34  Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 377–78 (1969) (quoting United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 
116, 120 (1966). 
35  See infra text accompanying notes 60–63. 
36  Betterman v. Montana, 136 S. Ct. 1609, 1614–15 (2016). 
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inconsistent with the text of the Sixth Amendment, which speaks in terms of the 
right to a speedy trial.37   
But there were obvious responses to this textual issue.  First, as the petitioner 
noted, the Founders likely assumed that sentencing proceedings occurred 
automatically upon conviction or within a very short time thereafter. 38   Thus, 
guaranteeing speedy trial doubtlessly, as a matter of established practice, also 
guaranteed a speedy sentencing.  Second, a strict textualist reading of the Sixth 
Amendment also suggests that the right to counsel should terminate upon 
conviction.  The Amendment states that “the accused shall . . . have the assistance 
of counsel for his defense.”  As the Betterman Court noted, the term “accused” 
suggests a right that applies only at trial and terminates upon conviction.39  The 
term “defense” also suggests a trial right that ends upon conviction.  The term 
“defense” is ordinarily understood to be either (a) the reason or reasons that a 
criminal defendant believes that the prosecutor “has no valid case” against her, or 
(b) the defendant’s “method and strategy” for convincing the factfinder that the 
prosecution has no valid case against her.40  One does not speak of a defendant’s 
presentation at sentencing as a “defense.”  That is normally described as an 
argument for leniency, and argument for a mitigated sentence, or simply presenting 
a “case as to sentence.”41 
The Betterman Court also indicated that it was unwilling to extend the speedy 
trial right to sentencing because of the remedy associated with the right.  “The sole 
remedy for a violation of the speedy trial right” is the “dismissal of the charges,” 
and it “would be an unjustified windfall, in most cases, to remedy sentencing delay 
                                                                                                                            
 
37  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
38  Petitioner raised this historical matter with the Court.  But the Court appears to have 
dismissed this appeal to originalism by reference to two treatises that indicated that sentencing could 
be postponed: 
As Betterman points out, at the founding, sentence was often imposed promptly after 
rendition of a verdict.  Brief for Petitioner 24–26.  But that was not invariably the case.  
For the court’s “own convenience, or on cause shown, [sentence could be] postpone[d] . . 
. to a future day or term.”  1 J. Bishop, Criminal Procedure § 1291, p. 767 (3d ed. 1880) 
(footnote omitted).  See also 1 J. Chitty, A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law 481 
(1819) (“The sentence . . . is usually given immediately after the conviction, but the court 
may adjourn to another day and then give judgment.”). 
136 S. Ct. at 1614 n.3.  How, precisely, sentencing proceedings were conducted at the Founding 
remains a matter of some disagreement.  See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Motive’s Role in Criminal 
Punishment, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 89, 131 n.183 (2006) (documenting disagreement about historical 
sentencing practice in early America).  The Court’s own opinions on this issue have been 
inconsistent.  See Hessick & Hessick, Procedural Rights, supra note 14, at 230 (describing how the 
Court’s account of historical sentencing practices “has evolved over time”). 
39  136 S. Ct. at 1614. 
40  See defense, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 365–67 (abr. 10th ed. 2015). 
41  Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 135 (1967). 
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by vacating validly obtained convictions.” 42   But Petitioner was not seeking 
dismissal of charges; he instead sought a reduction of sentence.43  Yet, the Court 
rejected the idea of a sentencing reduction out of hand, noting: “We have not read 
the Speedy Trial Clause . . . to call for a flexible or tailored remedy.  Instead we 
have held that violation of the right demands termination of the prosecution.”44   
It is unclear why the Court’s past practice in speedy trial cases must govern 
all future cases.  Courts often use their inherent power to fashion remedies to 
address the precise nature of harm suffered in a particular case. 45   When a 
defendant is denied effective assistance of counsel at trial, the remedy is to vacate 
the conviction and order a new trial.  But when a defendant is denied effective 
assistance only at sentencing, the remedy is to vacate the sentence—but not the 
conviction—and to remand for resentencing.  Because the right to counsel has 
evolved to apply at sentencing, the remedy for a violation of that right has also 
changed depending on the nature of the rights violation.  Given that the Court has, 
at times, been willing to create new, broader remedies,46 the Betterman Court was 
too dismissive of the idea that it could fashion a more narrow remedy for a speedy 
trial violation. 
 
IV. THE POSSIBILITY OF ENFORCEMENT IN CAPITAL SENTENCING PROCEEDINGS 
AND OTHER CONTEXTS 
 
The Betterman Court left open the possibility that the speedy trial right might 
apply to certain types of sentencing proceedings.  The majority opinion identified 
the penalty phase of capital trials, and Justice Thomas’s concurrence identified 
proceedings for “sentencing enhancements [that] operate as functional elements of 
a greater offense.”47  If a future case were to extend the speedy trial right to this 
limited set of sentencing proceedings, then the Court would be further exacerbating 
a flaw in its constitutional sentencing doctrine—namely, its decision to enforce 
more procedural rights in mandatory sentencing systems than in discretionary 
sentencing systems. 
At present, the Supreme Court has required different procedural rights at 
sentencing based on the amount of discretion that a judge enjoys.48  If a judge has 
discretion over certain policy decisions associated with sentencing, then “judges, 
                                                                                                                            
 
42  136 S. Ct. at 1615. 
43  Id. at 1615 n.6 
44  Id. 
45  See generally John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor’s Foot? The Inherent 
Remedial Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1121 (1996) (describing and criticizing 
the federal judiciary’s “assertion of inherent remedial power”). 
46  See, e.g., id. at 1124–27 (describing the breadth and scope of structural injunction cases). 
47  136 S. Ct. at 1613 n.2; id. at 1618 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
48  For more on this issue, see Hessick & Hessick, Procedural Rights, supra note 14. 
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not juries, may find the facts that affect the sentence; the government need not 
prove those facts beyond a reasonable doubt; defendants are not entitled to notice 
of the considerations that may increase their sentences; and their sentences may be 
increased under retroactive laws.”49  But if judges do not have that discretion—if a 
legislature or a sentencing commission has identified ex ante the findings that 
trigger certain sentencing consequences—then defendants have the right to have 
facts that increase a sentence found by a jury,50 the right to have those facts proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt,51 the right to notice of the facts that may increase their 
sentence,52 and the right not to be sentenced under retroactive laws that are harsher 
than the ones in effect at the time of the commission of the offense.53 
In some cases, when the Court has made the entitlement to a procedural right 
at sentencing dependent on the amount of a judge’s sentencing discretion, it has 
done so without explaining how the mandatory nature of a sentencing system is 
relevant to the text or purpose of that constitutional provision.54  In Betterman, the 
Court devoted a significant portion of the opinion to explaining the rationale 
behind the Speedy Trial Clause.  But it did not explain why its reasoning might 
play out differently in capital sentencings or proceedings associated with statutory 
sentencing enhancements. 
According to the Betterman Court, the Speedy Trial Clause exists to protect 
the presumption of innocence.55  A defendant who has been found guilty is no 
longer entitled to that presumption.  More specifically, the Betterman Court stated 
that “the major evils protected against by the speedy trial guarantee” are those that 
are triggered by arrest and persist until the end of trial: “Arrest is a public act that 
may seriously interfere with the defendant’s liberty, whether he is free on bail or 
not, and that may disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his 
associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family 
and his friends.”56 
But the Speedy Trial Clause also helps to guard against the problems 
associated with the passage of time that may interfere with a defendant’s ability to 
                                                                                                                            
 
49  Id. at 188. 
50  Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 
51  Id. 
52  Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 134 (1991). 
53  Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2083 (2013). 
54  E.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005) (stating that the Court has “never 
doubted” that the right to a jury trial of sentencing facts does not apply in discretionary systems).  
The Court did provide an explanation in Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 713–14 (2008).  But 
that explanation was deeply flawed.  See Hessick & Hessick, Procedural Rights, supra note 14, at 
209–14 (criticizing the analysis in Irizarry). 
55  See supra text accompanying notes 5–9. 
56  136 S. Ct. at 1615 (quoting United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971)). 
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defend herself,57 such as the decay of memory, the loss of evidence, and the death 
or disappearance of witnesses.58  Post-conviction sentencing delay can interfere 
with a defendant’s ability to make a persuasive case at sentencing; the loss of 
evidence, witnesses, and memories may prevent a defendant from presenting 
mitigating evidence at sentencing proceedings. 
It is presumably because of these concerns that the Justices left open the 
possibility that the speedy trial guarantee might apply to the penalty phase of a 
capital trial or proceedings associated with “sentencing enhancements [that] 
operate as functional elements of a greater offense.”59  But those proceedings, like 
all sentencing proceedings, “do not go to the question of guilt; they are geared, 
instead, to ascertaining the proper sentence.”60  Yet this is precisely the reason the 
Betterman Court gave for not extending the speedy trial rights to sentencing more 
generally. 
And, as with other procedural rights that the Court has made dependent upon 
the existence of judicial sentencing discretion, there is no sensible reason to make 
the speedy trial guarantee dependent upon the degree of policy authority a judge 
has over sentencing issues.  The concern about post-conviction sentencing delay is 
that it will result in the loss of evidence, witnesses, and memories, and that those 
losses will make it more difficult for a defendant to present mitigating evidence at 
sentencing.  Put differently, the concern is that a defendant will have more 
difficulty establishing a mitigating factual record if there is a significant delay 
after conviction and before sentencing.  But factual findings are as important in 
capital punishment proceedings and proceedings involving statutory sentencing 
enhancements as they were in Betterman’s sentencing proceeding.61 
The differences between the sentencing proceeding that took place in 
Betterman and the sentencing proceedings in capital punishment proceedings or 
proceedings involving statutory sentencing enhancements have nothing to do with 
a defendant’s ability to defend herself.  Capital sentencing proceedings involve 
                                                                                                                            
 
57  Earlier cases make clear that the Speedy Trial Clause is “essential to protect at least three 
basic demands of criminal justice in the Anglo-American legal system: ‘(1) to prevent undue and 
oppressive incarceration prior to trial, (2) to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public 
accusation and (3) to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to 
defend himself.’”  Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 377–78 (1969) (quoting United States v. Ewell, 
383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966)).  See also Betterman, 136 S. Ct. at 1614 (noting these three concerns). 
58  136 S. Ct. at 1615. 
59  Id. at 1613 n.2; id. 1618 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
60  Id. at 1616. 
61  That is because “the judge’s role in factfinding . . . is the same in both mandatory and 
discretionary sentencing systems.  In both systems, judges must make factual findings to determine 
what sentence to impose.”  Hessick & Hessick, Procedural Rights, supra note 14, at 200. 
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juries rather than judges.62  But the loss of evidence, witnesses, and memories is 
just as problematic for both types of decision makers.  
To be sure, proceedings involving statutory sentencing enhancements will 
involve factual questions that are specified ex ante rather than determined by a 
judge in a particular case.  And the consequences of those factual questions will 
change the range of a defendant’s punishment exposure (i.e., her statutory 
maximum punishment or her mandatory minimum punishment) rather than the 
judge’s decision regarding where in a particular range to punish a defendant.63  But 
these differences have nothing to do with whether the loss of evidence, witnesses, 
and memories will interfere with a defendant’s ability to obtain a mitigated 
sentence.  At most they will make the consequences of the defendant’s inability to 
obtain a mitigated sentence more visible and predictable. 
 
V.  THE POSSIBILITY OF A DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY SENTENCING 
 
The ultimate effect of the Betterman decision remains to be seen.  The Court 
left open the possibility that defendants could demand the right to a speedy post-
conviction sentencing proceeding under a claim to due process.  The idea that 
defendants might be able to secure certain constitutional rights at sentencing 
through the Due Process Clause is hardly new.  For example, in reversing 
sentences that were based on race, courts sometimes held those sentencing factors 
to be impermissible under the Due Process Clause, rather than under the Equal 
Protection Clause.64 
It is unclear whether defendants will fare as well under the Due Process 
Clause as they might have had the Court gone the other way in Betterman.  A due 
process right to a speedy sentencing is likely to be case-specific.  Both the majority 
opinion in Betterman and Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence indicated that any due 
process right to a speedy sentencing is likely to turn on questions such as the 
reasons for delay and what prejudice the defendant suffered.65  These sorts of 
vague standards may be more difficult for a defendant to enforce than bright line 
rules.   
But it is not necessary for the Court to resort to the vague guarantees of the 
Due Process Clause in order to ensure that defendants are not subject to lengthy 
                                                                                                                            
 
62  Some non-capital proceedings also involve juries.  See Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing As 
Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. REV. 311, 314 (2003). 
63  See Hessick & Hessick, Procedural Rights, supra note 14, at 200 (explaining that the 
difference between discretionary sentencing systems and mandatory sentencing enhancements “lies 
in policy and application decisions”). 
64  See Hessick & Hessick, Constitutional Rights, supra note 15, at 55. 
65  136 S. Ct. at 1618 n.12. 
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presentencing delays.66  If the Betterman Court had been willing to adapt a so-
called trial right to the sentencing context—as it has already done with the right to 
counsel—then resorting to due process would be unnecessary. 
 
                                                                                                                            
 
66  Indeed, in other contexts, the Court has expressed unwillingness to use the Due Process 
Clause when another, more specific constitutional right “provides an explicit textual source of 
constitutional protection.”  Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 
702, 721 (2010) (plurality opinion) (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (plurality 
opinion)).  See also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). 
